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(23) **JUGOSLAVIA.** A combination of military reverses and political uprisings has led subjects of Austria-Hungary, as formerly constituted, to join with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Montenegro and Croatia-Slavonia in creating Yugoslavia, a state which is to have a republican (probably) form of government, and already is assured of the good will if not (at present) the formal political support of the nations that have won the victory. Until the friction within the group, arising from differences of opinions as to the form the new state shall take, ceases and agreement is reached it will be difficult for a solution to be agreed upon with any degree of permanency.

(24) **ITALY—IRREDENTA.** Trentino, Küstenland and Dalmatia, with their Yugoslavic and Austrian German populations, will not return to ante-bellum conditions. Precise prophecy as to the future is difficult, but agreement already arrived at makes probable not only satisfaction of most of Italian ambitions but also furtherance of the Yugoslavic hope for access to the Adriatic as well as for a federalized state, republican or monarchical (constitutional) in form.

(25) **SERBIA.** Assured substantial restoration of entity much as she was ere the war began, Serbia either as the dominant unit in a Yugoslavic state or singly, presumably stands to gain territorially from accretions taken from Macedonia, especially in that area seized by Bulgaria in 1915.

(26) **MACEDONIA,** that prior to the war was divided between Turkey, Serbia and Greece, and that during the war has seen Serbian and Greek areas of the land successfully invaded by Bulgaria, now awaits a new partition in which Bulgaria will suffer and from which Greece and Serbia will gain. Or there may be another effort to "internationalize" control of the country under the control of the Powers.

(27) **JUGOSLAVIA.** For this new State, for Macedonia and for northern Greece much of their future welfare depends upon the Conference's decision as to the hinterland which they represent. They want an inlet and outlet for commerce and travel, that is, a port on the Adriatic, one which will not be open or closed at the variable will of Italy, which more than ever is to be the dominant Power on the Adriatic.

(28) **MONTENEGRO.** With its almost solidly Serbian population and its fiercely held and protected national traditions, it nevertheless may fall in with the plan to federate the southern Slavic peoples in a new nation in which the rights of the several entities will be carefully guarded: but there is a present strong demand for alliance with Serbia, and King Nicholas has been deposed.

(29) **ALBANIA.** Albania proper, during the war, has had a loose form of home rule. Her past antipathy to Italy has been modified somewhat and will tend to make her side with that country as over against Greece, if the conflicting claims of the two nations for Albanian territory come before the Conference. There may be continuation of nominal international control as prior to the war, or a division between Serbia and Greece, or annexation to Italy. But Albania has ideas of her own.

(30) **BULGARIA.** Defeated, and disclosed as ultra brutal in her treatment of prisoners of war and popu-

lations under her power during the war, she is not likely to get concessions of territory either in the Dobrudja district or in European Turkey.

(31) **EUROPEAN TURKEY.** The broad statement that as far as the consensus of opinion of American and European statesmen and journalists goes, Turkey's expulsion from Europe is decreed, covers the case and indicates what the conference is likely to do. Greece and Bulgaria would be the natural heirs to the estate with odds now favoring Greece. A more international policy, however, may be worked out, such as is planned for control of Constantinople, at least the internationalization of the Dardanelles. Progressive Turks in increasing numbers favor American trusteeship for a term of years.

(32) **THE DRAVA, SERES AND THE KAVALLA** region of Greece as defined by the Treaty of Bucharest gave to that kingdom valuable territory in Macedonia east of the Struma river and bounded by Thrace and all lying at the head of the Aegean Sea. During the war, by means far from creditable, Bulgaria and her Allies won control of this ceded region, and its return to Greece is one detail of a general settlement of the Macedonian question.

THE "CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR" AND THE PRINCIPLE OF INTER- NATIONAL DEFENSE

By JULIA GRACE WALES

THE present article is an inquiry into the logic of conscientious objection to military service. It has been prompted by a growing conviction that those very principles which the conscientious objector himself assumes as fundamental will, if logically followed out, lead to the conclusion that every citizen of the world ought at present to bear a share in international defense.

Of the chief forms of conscientious objection, the most common, the most fundamental, and the most difficult to approach with argument is the objection to fighting *per se*. The conscientious objector very likely feels that he holds it not on any ground of argument, but on the ground of an instinctive conviction which he is himself unable to analyze. So strong is the sense of instinctive perception that he cannot conscientiously do other than follow it. He is willing to admit at the same time that other men may have an equally strong conviction of duty to follow an opposite course.

The fighter who is conscientious and humane is moved by an impulse to protect the helpless and to defend the right and by willingness to lay down his life for others. The non-resister is not willing to admit that he does not share these motives; but he is moved at the same time by a conviction that warfare is in itself essentially wrong and that to employ it, therefore, will only defeat the end—the defense of right and the protection of the helpless. The first may admit reluctance to kill, but prefers killing the guilty to allowing the destruction of the innocent. The second man refuses to admit the dilemma, but insists that on the whole and in the long

run the innocent can best be protected without recourse to arms. May we perhaps by analyzing these two states of feeling find that they are not truly antagonistic, but can be brought into harmony?

In the first place, it may be more possible than we should suppose to analyze the objection to fighting. In other words, the objector may be mistaken in thinking that his objection to fighting is wholly fundamental and instinctive. Are there perhaps behind it certain primary truths instinctively perceived? And between these truths and a secondary conclusion—that it is always wrong to fight—may there be a subconscious and obscure train of reasoning that needs to be carefully examined?

The objection to fighting seems to consist of any or all of the following feelings:

- (1) A sense of the sacredness of human life;
- (2) A sense of the superiority of moral to physical forces;
- (3) A sense of the unsoundness of coercion—that is, a belief in freedom as an ultimate principle of action;
- (4) A feeling that the self should not be defended at the expense of another—that is, a belief in altruism as an ultimate principle of action;
- (5) A belief in "passive resistance" to evil—that is, a conviction of a duty to resist evil to the point of avoiding complicity in evil.

In connection with the last it is noteworthy that most conscientious objectors mean by "non-resistance" not literal non-resistance to evil, but passive resistance; otherwise they would not resist the draft. Passive resistance to evil, refusal to be guilty of complicity in what he regards as wrong, is fundamental in the thinking of the conscientious objector. Upon the above five assumptions he bases his theory that he would under any circumstances do wrong to fight. How far is his reasoning correct?

And now, first, the sacredness of human life: Is there anything in this axiom to lead us to the conclusion that the taking of life is always wrong? The conscientious objector will be the first to admit that the giving of life for another is often necessary and right. Destruction of life is not necessarily moral evil. The continuance of physical life is not the greatest spiritual good. The laying down of physical life may under some circumstances, when it is to save others, be a far greater spiritual good. It may even be right for human beings to take the life of a human being deliberately when that life is voluntarily offered for others, as in the case of vitally important medical experimentation. Again, the sacredness of life might conceivably demand the forcible taking of life in order to save life. For example: A and B are in the water; C, D, E, F, etc., are in a crowded lifeboat. A frantically tries to get into the boat, which is in danger of being overturned. B must not only be willing to drown himself, but must, if necessary, knock A on the head in order to save the occupants of the boat. Otherwise, by not using his powers to prevent destruction of life, B becomes guilty of complicity in destruction of life. In the case of this illustration, we are aware that the conclusion may be disputed by the conscientious objector on the ground of axiom 3, which we shall discuss later—that is, on the ground of his objection to coercion.

Obviously, however, the objection to fighting is not based directly on the theory of the sacredness of life. The sacredness of life may itself involve laying down life or taking life in order to save life.

Let us now examine the second assumption: the superiority of moral to physical forces. The phrase "the use of force," often on the lips of the conscientious objector, is ambiguous. It may mean either the use of material forces or the use of coercion. There is in the mind of the conscientious objector no ethical objection to the use of material forces. We use physical force to build a house, to prepare a meal, to offer a hand to a friend. The material world is given to us, like clay to a class in modeling, to make what we can of it; and the task of humanity, to be wrought by spirit upon a resisting material medium, is to bring in the kingdom of heaven upon earth. The conscientious objector will be the first to admit that the material means must be directed to spiritual ends, that spiritual ends have to be served by material means, and that, so far as this life is concerned, spirit itself must be incarnate. Thus, while the conscientious objector will maintain his contention that spiritual means must never be discarded in favor of material, and that material means are of value only so long as they express or serve spiritual ends, he will admit, we think, that a means is not to be discarded merely on the ground that it implies the use of physical forces.

It is with the question of coercion that we come to the crux of the argument. The conscientious objector is in reality not so much a non-resister as what we may term a non-coercionist. He believes that no man has the right to interfere with the life of another, that every human being must be allowed to learn by his own mistakes and to work out his salvation in his own way, and that the ideal of human intercourse is freedom for all. He is not willing to coerce; he is not willing to judge another; he is not willing to set himself up as better than another either to control or to judge.

Now, let us see where the doctrine of non-coercion—that is, of freedom—as the ideal of collective life, logically leads us. Freedom means liberty not for one individual alone—that is autocracy—not for a few individuals—that is aristocracy—but for all individuals alike. And in what is this freedom to consist? Inner liberty there is in any case. Though a man be shut behind prison walls, his mind may still be to him a kingdom. Outer liberty has immediately to do with material things. If all the individuals are to have any sort of equal liberty, then each individual must have an autonomy clearly defined, and no individual must violate the autonomy of any other.

Let us examine the problem in its simplest and most abstract form. Let A, B, C, etc., be ten men living on an island away from all other inhabited land. They divide the island equitably among them. If A violates the autonomy of B, enters his territory, and begins to take possession of his things, what is B's duty to the community?

"B should let A take his things," the conscientious objector may reply. "Things are of no absolute value in any case. B remains free in himself, and by yielding his things he may teach A the spirit of co-operation."

Is B then to take no responsibility as to what shall be

done with his things? Must he allow A to put them to any use whatsoever? And how far is B to yield to A's coercion? Must he himself do whatever A tries to make him do? Where does he draw the line? Is he to fetch and carry for A? Is he to become A's slave?

"No," replies the conscientious objector, "by no means; for here enters the principle of passive resistance. B himself remains free to do as he thinks best. He does not take orders. If A tries to compel him to do what he does not choose to do, he offers passive resistance—that is, such resistance as he can offer without any counter aggression upon A."

But if B does not resist A's taking possession of his things, why, we ask, should he resist coercion as regards his own action?

"Because," replies the conscientious objector, "he has an inalienable responsibility regarding his own person. In regard to action he is, as a human being, under all circumstances both responsible and free."

In other words it seems to be a theory of the conscientious objector that if A takes B's coat, B must let A have his cloak also, but if A would compel B to go a mile, B shall not go a step if he does not choose to do so.

The conscientious objector will perhaps here wish to distinguish injurious from harmless actions. B, on the demand that he go a mile, shall go twain if no harm is to result thereby. But the question immediately arises, Does this principle apply also to things? Has B the right to give C's cloak as well as his own—and D's cloak? Does the rule of non-resistance perhaps apply only when A and B are the only inhabitants of the island or the only persons at all concerned in the transaction? When the rights of C, D, and the rest enter the problem, does the principle perhaps change? And if so, how does it change?

We here suggest that light may be thrown on the problem by the fact already noted above—that in collective life as opposed to purely individual, freedom must be considered not only in relation to action but in relation to things. Also, as the conscientious objector admits when he admits the principle of passive resistance, freedom involves responsibility to avoid complicity in evil. When the individual is assigned autonomy by the community with regard to his share of things, he immediately becomes responsible to the community for what is done with his things. He has no right to injure the community by his actions. He has no right to let any one coerce him into injuring the community by his actions. He has no right to injure the community by the wrong use of his things. He has no right to let any one else coerce him into letting his things be put to wrong uses.

If, then, A tries to use B's things for the purpose of coercing others, B is under obligation to the community to exercise force if necessary against A to the point of preventing such use of B's things. If B does other than this, he is guilty of complicity in coercion. Hence, a degree of preventive coercion is rendered not only justifiable but obligatory by the principle of non-coercion itself. The aim and method of such resistance is not to create, but to avoid, coercion; and failure to exercise it is to be guilty of complicity in coercion. Let us therefore call it by the name of forcible resistance to coer-

cion. It is especially to be noted that the justification of forcible resistance to coercion is found not in self-defense, but in refusal to be guilty of complicity in aggression upon the common liberty. Moreover, so far from conflicting with the axiom that the self must not be defended at the expense of another, such action may imply the sacrifice of the self for the sake of the community.

But, as the conscientious objector will be quick to point out, if any argument for resistance is to be based on community responsibility, it is obvious that B's primary appeal should be not to force but to law. If B is under obligation to the community not to let his things be used for purposes of aggression upon other members of the community, then the other members of the community are under equal obligation to help B in protecting the common liberties, B's included. Further, it is the right of the community as a whole to determine whether or not actual aggression has occurred and how the common safety shall be protected. Therefore, when A commits aggression upon B's territory, B's immediate duty is to notify the other members of the community, unless he himself can by moral suasion induce A to desist. But while it is of course better that force if it is needed should be exercised by the nine than that it should be exercised by B alone, yet in case of emergency, if B is unable to control A by other means and if vital harm may be done before the others can take effectual action, B is in the meantime under obligation himself to resist A by force.

The conscientious objector will perhaps hold that the moral intervention of the nine will in practically all cases be enough to stop A's aggression, and that once there has been appeal to law, force will not be needed. It remains conceivable, however, that moral protest will not be enough. In that case, the principle of non-coercion demands that the nine exercise force to the point of confining the aggressor within the limits of his own autonomy.

It may of course be argued that if B, C, etc., agree unanimously to meet A's aggression with non-resistance, they may do so without violation of the principle of non-coercion—that is, of freedom. Obviously, however, if one of the nine dissents from this course, the remaining eight cannot employ non-resistance without complicity in A's coercion of the tenth. Again, suppose that each of the ten is a group or nation instead of an individual. The course of non-resistance—if it is to avoid conflict with the principle of non-coercion—cannot be followed unless the population of each unit is itself unanimous; and in the case of nations even such unanimity would not justify non-resistance, for it is impossible to get the vote of succeeding generations, whose rights—in that it is a more serious loss to be brought up in slavery than to become slaves—are even more deeply involved than are those of the present generation.

To sum up, if we accept the five principles laid down at the beginning of this argument, it seems clear that nations may sometimes have a duty to engage in defensive war. The community of nations as a whole has a duty to resist any aggressor who vitally threatens the freedom of future generations. Nations offering ideal resistance would endeavor to save life but would be

willing to kill when life is immediately attacked. They would prefer moral forces to physical and would never cease to employ moral forces to the utmost, but they would exercise physical force if necessary to the extent of effectually confining the aggressor within the limits of his own autonomy. And they would base their action not upon self-defense, but upon refusal to be guilty of complicity in aggression upon the common liberties of the race.

It is interesting to note that the government of the United States in its method of entering the world war has set a precedent in the application of these very principles. The President appealed to the remaining neutrals to join in at least moral protest against German aggression. He accompanied the declaration of war with a statement of the immediate conditions of peace. He has insisted that every people shall have the right of self-determination regarding its own internal affairs. He has continually emphasized the international nature of the present task of war as a disinterested public service. And he has throughout not ceased to add moral forces to physical by holding before the enemy and the world a standing challenge to sound settlement on the principles of universal justice.

"GERMAN YOUTH AND WHAT THE FUTURE DEMANDS OF THEM."

By W. B., Prisoner of War, German Democrat in France

[Translated for the ADVOCATE OF PEACE by Carrie W. Ormsbee.]

SPEECHLESS with horror, we regard the consequences of the world war which for four years has polluted the earth of Europe with its blood stream, converted fruitful fields for decades into waste lands, and swept away villages and cities with its fiery breath. The youth of the civilized world have been rending one another in mad murder. On the Russian snowfields, in Flanders, in Champagne, and before Verdun they lie buried, all these young, happy men, at the caprice of an autocrat in search of fame and power, torn away from the contented quiet of every-day life and flung into the ravenous jaws of the Moloch of war. The cities of the interior are crowded with cripples and blind; thousands populate insane asylums; thousands crawl about with dim, staring eyes, in their hearts only the death that brings release from prolonged disease.

How was it possible that we, who claim to be thinking, feeling people, could be progressive in the arts and sciences, and yet remain in the grasp of barbaric customs of centuries long past? Let us reply: because all our progress had been limited; because our affairs of State had not kept pace with modern advance, but remained as they had been handed down to us from the middle ages; because, instead of a government by the people, in step with them and answerable to them, we have as our head a ruler "by the grace of God," responsible only to the dear God; one who does not know nor regard his people, their needs nor their ways of life, and yet rules over millions of men, whom he can order into death and misery, if that furthers his own ambi-

tious plans; because men stand at the side of this ruler "by God's grace," who order their lives and activities according to medieval, long-discarded conceptions of right and honor; finally, because we have a government to whom individual and State codes of morality are distinctly different things. The individual must see to it that in strife for his own well-being he does not harm his fellow-men; while, on the other hand, the State may employ the worst methods—even deceit and perjury and murder—whenever it seems to further its own interests.

Can the world, that today confronts us, armed to vanquish this German, or rather Prussian, spirit, in order to restore value to right, to give the world freedom, and to release it from the eternal menace of these dark powers, count on us, the German youth? No, not yet. We must first learn what true freedom, (real) honor, and morality are; we must first break through the walls with which a false education, forcible suppression of every instinct of freedom has surrounded us. A large share of the guilt falls upon you, you instructors and trainers of German youth, whether you disseminated your wisdom from the desk of the folk school, the gymnasium, or the professor's chair at the university! You were riper in years and experience than we; independent thought, conscientious proof, and honorable judgment should be required of you. The higher your position, the deeper you had penetrated into the realms of human knowledge, the greater and weightier your responsibility. You poisoned our spirit. Instead of pointing out for our trusting hearts, thirsty for knowledge and beauty, the way to the highest ideals of humanity, to freedom, right, and honor, you shamefully abused our confidence. By interception of truth, falsification of facts, and even by lying and deceit, you have designedly produced conceited, hypocritical fools. You have fed us with false ideals and the morals of immorality; you have sown the poisonous seed of hate in our young hearts in order to make us from childhood pliant slaves of a man of violence. Our brothers in other lands, with whom we should work in brotherly love and respect for the progress of man, to whom we were united by the bond of a common culture, you have made our enemies; made us worthy to be hated and despised by them. You say, We were not free ourselves; we were compelled to teach what we were ordered. That is only proof of lack of character and weakness. The example of men who have gone to prison for their opinions, to whom their clear conscience was of higher value than outward honor and material gain, should have shown you how the conscientious man, awake to his responsibilities, should act.

Serious duties await us, upon fulfillment of which the welfare of our people and the dawn of a new era depend. The eyes of the world rest upon us, the young generation, the future Germany. Upon our conduct will hang the decision of the world as to whether we shall be deemed worthy again to enjoy the respect and confidence of other nations and be admitted to a union of free peoples. First we must free ourselves from the false pride with which we have been inoculated, from the prejudices unworthy a reasoning being, in order to think freely and correctly, and with critical eyes to learn to test facts, even when the decision that we must render fills us with